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What constitutes liberal education and
what are its boundaries? Such ques-
tions are perhaps best addressed in
moments of tension, when liberal edu-
cation is perceived as being under
threat. The appearance of a small num-
ber of students wearing the face-veil or
niqab at the American University in
Cairo (AUC) a foreign private university
located in Egypt, and Leiden University
(LU) a state university in the Nether-
lands, has emerged as just such a
threat. Despite significant differences
in their institutional histories and in
the national and legal contexts in
which they operate, face covering was
banned at AUC and LU. These bans were justified on remarkably simi-
lar grounds, at the core of which were arguments that face covering is
inherently incompatible with principles and practices of liberal educa-
tion. Yet the bans speak to issues far larger than pedagogy in liberal
educational settings; they get to the core of critical issues relating to
integration, liberalism, and the possibly uneasy place of Islam in it all. 
Comparative cases
During the fall term of 2000 a single Egyptian undergraduate student
at AUC majoring in psychology arrived to campus wearing a n i q a b . I n
the course of 2002-3 two undergraduate students of Moroccan origin
in the Department of Arabic, Persian and Turkish Languages and Cul-
tures (TCIMO) at LU did the same. In both cases the appearance of a
n i q a b wearer(s), or m u n a q q a b a ( t ) resulted in bans on face veiling. The
justifications for the bans were forceful and uncannily similar in both
contexts. In the case of AUC senior members of the administration rea-
soned that the presence of a m u n a q q a b a ‘disturbed’ classes, ‘distract-
ed’ from group discussions, caused others ‘uneasiness’ and ‘scared’
staff and students. In January 2001 AUC issued a formal statement ban-
ning face veiling on the dual grounds that it presented security and
identification problems and was inimical to liberal arts education since
it inhibited ‘dialogue and intellectual interaction with colleagues and
with other members of the University community.’ AUC further justi-
fied its ban by invoking a 1994 Ministry of Education order upheld by
the Supreme Constitutional Court in 1996 that forbids the n i q a b at na-
tional Egyptian educational institutions. AUC’s policy forbidding the
niqab was subsequently included in applications for admission and in
its formal regulations regarding student conduct.
At Leiden University a small number of senior faculty members object-
ed to the presence of two munaqqabat in their classes on the familiar
grounds that face covering ‘impeded interactive communication in the
classroom’ and caused staff and other students to be ‘uncomfortable.’
They brought the matter to the Dean of the Faculty asking that the Uni-
versity take an official stand on face veiling. The Board of the Universi-
ty decided to officially ban face covering just days before the begin-
ning of the academic year 2003-4. The decision came on the heels of a
decision by the Equal Treatment Commission (case no. 2003-40) that
ruled that an institution for vocational training and adult education in
Amsterdam was entitled to prohibit wearing the n i q a b on the school’s
g r o u n d s .1
The subsequent LU ban was inserted in
the highest level of university legisla-
tion and states, in short, that it is pro-
hibited to wear clothing or attributes
that cover the face in educational set-
tings within the university and during
examinations. The ban is justified on
grounds that ‘communication be-
tween student and teacher and
amongst students (or teachers) is in-
dispensable,’ that ‘facial expressions
are essential in communication,’ and
that at examinations ‘the identity of
the person taking the exam needs to
be beyond doubt’. The Leiden decision
was followed by a preemptive face-
covering ban at Utrecht University, since no students to date have
worn the niqab there. After some struggle, and given the late date of
the ban, the two m u n a q q a b a t students at LU were permitted to finish
out the academic year, however they are not allowed to remain at the
university until their anticipated graduation in two years time if they
continue to wear the n i q a b.
Contrasting legal and political contexts 
While the processes leading to face-covering bans at both AUC and
LU were remarkably similar, the legal and political contexts in which
the bans came about differed in some fundamental ways. In Egypt
the legality of the ban was called into question and led to a spate of
court cases in which two major questions were addressed: is the
niqab a requirement in Islam?; and does the niqab pose risks to na-
tional security? The latter issue relates to regime concerns dating to
the 1970s when intensive militant Islamic activities at national uni-
versities became widespread. Unlike AUC, a small, private liberal arts
university for the elite, Egypt’s national universities have been con-
sidered a potential security threat and subsequently been under
heavy state security surveillance. The n i q a b, due to the fact that it
conceals the wearer’s identity, obstructs mechanisms of surveillance.
In 1996 the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt overturned sever-
al lower courts rulings and upheld the niqab ban on the grounds that,
as stated in Article II of the ruling, ‘The niqab is not stipulated for
under the preemptory provisions of the sharia. And it is in the inter-
est of the society that individuals are identified, in order to control
their conduct.’
Despite the court ruling, enforcing the n i q a b ban has proved exceed-
ingly difficult. Scores of students in Egypt’s national universities wear
the niqab. At AUC the number of munaqqabat students has actually in-
creased from one to five students since the ban took effect. Technical-
ly, the AUC students argue that they’re complying with university reg-
ulations since they’ve removed the cloth face cover that makes up the
n i q a b, however they replaced it with a piece of blank paper. When that
was forbidden, they walked about campus covering their faces with
their hands. Last spring the Vice-President for Student Affairs declared
in exasperation, ‘You are not allowed to put clothes, papers, hands, not
even your finger on your face!’ 2 Implementing the ban in an environ-
ment where even upper class AUC students are increasingly involved
in, or sympathetic to, the tenets of the growing pietistic movement re-
mains a challenge.
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Current Issues
In the Netherlands legal argumentations around face veiling bans
avoid specifically Islamic references, for this would be considered a
case of direct discrimination on the basis of religion.3 Hence, the term
‘face coverings’ is employed rather than ‘n i q a b ’ . Still, in the above men-
tioned Amsterdam case the Equal Treatment Commission has ac-
knowledged that this phrasing constitutes a case of ‘indirect discrimi-
nation,’ as it disproportionately affects those who adhere to a particu-
lar religious conviction (interestingly, the Commission didn’t raise the
point that the ban can represent a form of gender discrimination as it
disproportionately affects female students). Indirect discrimination is,
however, allowed if there is an ‘objective justification’ which makes a
ruling necessary. The Commission accepted the school’s arguments
that face covering impedes communication, that the whole school
should be seen as a pedagogical setting (it should be noted that the
girls agreed to remove the face cover in classroom settings), that it hin-
ders identification which also poses a security risk and that it strongly
diminishes the girls’ chances for internships and future employment.
This decision was exactly what the Board of Leiden University had been
waiting for. However, whereas the Board had wanted to apply the Am-
sterdam order in its entirety, due to the intervention of student repre-
sentatives at the University Council, the ban was modified to apply to
classroom settings and exams only, rather than to all university build-
ings and grounds. 
Integration and the face
The emphasis on open facial communication as a central value of lib-
eral education, including the importance of student participation,
needs some closer scrutiny. One central element in interactive liberal
education is precisely that students are to be evaluated on the basis of
their ability to partake in rational debate and on the basis of the quali-
ty of their arguments. It is then remarkable that students wearing the
n i q a b—presumably just as potentially able as others to bring forward
their arguments—are a priori disqualified by the sheer fact that their
facial features are not visible. Such a perspective goes against the grain
of Habermasian notions of the modern public sphere where only the
force of arguments is supposed to count; it is rather grounded in long
standing assumptions commonly employed in such fields as physiog-
nomy that external appearance, including facial expressions, are a di-
rect reflection of inner states of being. Simultaneously, a highly ideal-
ized notion of the workings of the educational regime is employed. Ed-
ucation is not only about the exchange of ideas and the communica-
tion of knowledge, it is also about producing certain notions of self and
normative behaviors. It is precisely for these reasons that it was
deemed necessary in both cases to ban the n i q a b.
The sense of unease and feelings of discomfort some staff members
and university administrators at LU expressed when discussing the
n i q a b does not, however, only refer to (anticipated) problems of com-
munication. Something else seems to be at stake. They also referred to
the idea that by wearing the n i q a b these girls ‘set themselves apart’ or
more explicitly ‘show that they do not accept our central values.’ In
other words, wearing n i q a b is not only seen as a challenge to the nor-
mative structure of liberal education, but simultaneously as a refusal to
integrate in Dutch society.
We need then to place these discussions about the n i q a b within the
framework of major shifts in the political landscape, the fall-out of 11
September 2001, of the right-wing anti-Muslim populism of Pim For-
tuyn, and of a political climate in which derogatory statements about
Arabs and Muslims appear increasingly to be more acceptable. These
factors came to the fore very strongly in the public reactions to the Am-
sterdam case. Prominent politicians belonging to a variety of political
parties all made statements against wearing the n i q a b; one even went
so far as to argue that if the girls would succeed in their appeal, na-
tional legislation ought to be drafted that would forbid wearing n i q a b
in all public spaces (in a phone-in radio programme, over 90% of the
callers supported this proposal).
That the ban of the n i q a b needs to be seen within the framework of a
changed political climate is strongly supported when comparing the
ruling of the Equal Treatment Commission on the Amsterdam case in
2003 with a very similar case in 2000, also about regulations prohibit-
ing face coverings at an educational institution. In the latter case (no.
2000-63) the Commission argued that there was no objective justifica-
tion for indirect discrimination and explicitly stated in its ruling that
wearing the n i q a b ‘leaves sufficient possibilities for communication’
(also non-verbal) and that the school should take into consideration
that ‘in a multicultural society as the Netherlands not all groups in so-
ciety show their feelings through facial expression.’ This is a very dif-
ferent position from that taken up in the abovementioned ruling of
2003. That wearing the n i q a b is seen as a refusal to adapt to Dutch
norms and values is further compounded by the way in which the
n i q a b is linked to a particular strand of Islam. It appears that the prob-
lem is not so much that these students bring a religious symbol into
the classroom, for the h i j a b, or headscarf has become more acceptable,
but that the n i q a b is linked to radical Islam. Such informally expressed
concerns cannot factor into official argumentation in the Dutch politi-
cal-legal setting, as banning n i q a b for political reasons would consti-
tute direct discrimination. Indeed the Equal Treatment Commission
has made it explicit that schools are not allowed to ban dressing styles
on the grounds that they express particular political points of view
(such as bomber jackets which can represent radical right sympathies),
as this would infringe on the principle of freedom of expression. 
In the Egyptian context a compelling set of political and security con-
cerns accompanied the policy of banning face veiling at national uni-
versities. In the case of the private, foreign AUC, however, security con-
cerns were overridden by arguments about the role of the university in
reproducing a particular type of liberal culture and accompanying nor-
mative behaviors. The practice of covering the face has been seen to
fundamentally contravene the university’s mission. Indeed as respons-
es to the niqab in both the AUC and LU cases illustrate, the practice of
face veiling has seriously tested the boundaries of who can and should
participate in liberal educational institutions as well as in liberal soci-
eties writ large. The point here is not to make light of the unease and
discomfort teachers may experience when confronted with students
who cover their face. Rather, the question is whether feelings of dis-
comfort are valid grounds to ban particular forms of dress and, subse-
quently, specific categories of students from the university? Should the
wearing of the n i q a b be understood implicitly or explicitly as a refusal
to integrate into the values of liberal universities, and, by extension,
liberal societies? Is banning the most suitable way of responding to dif-
ference, or might the university be better served
by embarking on an openended complex process
involving debate, inquiry and dissent in a manner
that could lead to the expansion, rather than nar-
rowing, of the boundaries of liberal education?
N o t e s
1 . The Equal Treatment Commission monitors
compliance with the Dutch Equal Treatment
Act which prohibits discrimination in
education and employment on grounds
such as religion, sex, race, and political
o r i e n t a t i o n .
2 . The interview was with Mohamed Farouq
A l-Hitami and cited in the AUC student
newspaper The Caravan, Issue no. 17, Vol. 8 3 ,
March 9, 2003.
3 . The Commission does not discuss whether
wearing n i q a b is an Islamic requirement.
I t considers it sufficient that a category
o f persons believes it to be such.
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